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Panel 2: How Are Laws Applied and Detention Practices Reformed?
Reforming Interrogation Practices:
Alexis St. Martin and the Post-9/11 Era Opportunity
Remarks of Eugene R. Fidell*

O

n

June 6, 1822,

a man named

Alexis St. Martin

suf-

set of outer limits for interrogations – surely a first in our country – beyond the bare bones (so to speak) of the Torture Act of
2000.3 As Professor David Cole of Georgetown has reminded
us, President George W. Bush vetoed a bill requiring the CIA to
hew to the interrogation techniques approved by that manual.4
Less promisingly, Congress also conferred on President Bush
the power to define what conduct represents cruel, inhuman,
and degrading treatment for purposes of Common Article 3 of
the Geneva Conventions5 – a power he promptly used to blow
an Alexis-St. Martin-size hole in the Conventions.6
There is no doubt that this is unfamiliar territory for us
and our political and legal institutions. Who would ever have
thought that an on-leave law professor working in the Office of
Legal Counsel would be called upon – and would accept the task
– of defining torture by reference to antiseptic-sounding clinical
concepts such as “organ failure.”7 Or that we would be faced
with a bizarre arrangement under which detailed rules might be
spelled out for military personnel while CIA operatives were left
to their own devices?
What we have, thanks in large measure to the Freedom of
Information Act8 and litigants willing to invoke it (and government employees willing to “leak”), is a measure of transparency
far beyond what is customary in such sensitive matters. Are
we learning more than we need to know? Is that even possible, given the disastrous course of the last several years under
President Bush?
Personally, although I believe there are aspects to governmental activity that can and should be kept out of the public
eye, my view is that the St. Martin experience we have endured
on the subject of interrogation is a salutary one. We’ve seen upclose-and-personal the nasty side of interrogations. The question
is what we are going to do about it.
Whether there will be a formal reckoning (in the sense of
criminal prosecution) with respect to interrogation abuses, as
has increasingly been suggested,9 remains to be seen, but even
if no one is punished through the criminal process as opposed to
the judgment of history, there are lessons to be learned. Congress
has to be more aggressive about its oversight responsibilities. A
harbinger of things to come in this regard is the report issued
in late 2008 by the Senate Armed Services Committee on the
treatment of detainees in United States custody. Unfortunately,
much of that report remains classified, but it is to the credit of
Senator Carl Levin and his colleagues that the summary10 was
made public.
Impeachment is another legislative function. There was
never any meaningful support for impeaching President Bush11

fered a close-range shotgun blast while working as a

voyageur for the American Fur Company on Mackinac
Island, Michigan. He had the good fortune to be attended by
William Beaumont (1785–1853), a surgeon in the United States
Army (for whom an Army hospital in El Paso, Texas, is named
to this day). Mr. St. Martin’s fist-sized wound was grievous and
did not heal promptly. Instead, it remained open – this is known
as a permanent gastric fistula – and permitted, apparently for the
first time, a sustained direct view of the digestive process. Dr.
Beaumont conducted important experiments that significantly
increased scientific knowledge.1 For his part, Mr. St. Martin
lived to the ripe old age of 86, dying in Canada in 1880.
Now why in the world, you are wondering, am I going into
this tale? The answer is simple: the events of the last few years
have given us a comparable opportunity to see and perhaps better understand interrogation than most of us who are not in law
enforcement have had in earlier times.

***
The news media have paid close attention to interrogation
techniques, and even casual readers of the newspapers who
never served a day in either law enforcement, the military, or
the intelligence agencies, at least recognize the term “Field
Manual” as if it was a “Betty Crocker” cookbook or Boy Scouts
publication.
We know from the “torture papers” that the Office of Legal
Counsel in the last administration – or at least some of its high
officials – joining forces with Vice President Dick Cheney’s
staff and other allies, secretly sought to authorize, or at least
immunize from prosecution, various forms of torture and
other ill-treatment of detainees by erecting permissive definitions. Congress was complicit, even if it was not privy to the
Yoo-Bybee memoranda of 2002–03, by including within the
Military Commissions Act a provision that effectively immunized certain conduct by interrogators undertaken prior to the
effective date of the MCA.
On the other hand, Congress and President Obama have both
sought to freeze permissible interrogation techniques by enacting into law a mere Army “Field Manual,”2 seeking to impose a

* Eugene Fidell is the President of the National Institute of Military
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“Because abusive interrogation practices can have such
disastrous effects – not only on the affected individuals,
but for our country as a whole – we should resist the
temptation to put this unpleasant episode behind us and
to take no further, continuing interest in the subject.
To do so is to invite trouble.”
because of the unsettling effect of such action on the country as
a whole. This was especially so as the end of his second term
loomed. But what of subordinate civilian officials? Would no
purpose have been served by considering the impeachment of
some of them, to impose a moral stigma, for example, and bar
them from holding federal office in the future?12
Call me naïve, but it is my conviction that despite the failing
marks a number of important institutions in American government and society have earned in the past several years, “sunlight,” which Justice Brandeis aptly described as the “best of
disinfectants,”13 has played a potent and positive role. Because
abusive interrogation practices can have such disastrous effects
– not only on the affected individuals, but for our country as a
whole – we should resist the temptation to put this unpleasant
episode behind us and to take no further, continuing interest in
the subject. To do so is to invite trouble.

laws, the Convention against Torture, Common Article 3 of the
Geneva Conventions, or the Field Manuals. Executive Order
13491 bespeaks a measure of publicly-acknowledged personal
involvement on the part of the Chief Executive that is not only
a sharp break from the immediate past but also important for
the signal it sends throughout the government and to interested
foreign observers.
Second, we should never lose sight of the golden rule. Our
concern at all times must be to maintain the high ground not
only because of our national moral compass, but also because
the tables may well be turned if and when our personnel fall into
enemy hands. This is an easy rule to remember and apply.
We must be prepared for detentions, rather than have to
make up the rules, and search for legal authority, in real time.
We must insist on training. Interrogation may be a science;
it is certainly an art.18 It makes no more sense to undertake an
interrogation program without trained interrogators than it does
to send into battle infantrymen who lack training in the use of
their weapons.
We must recognize that interrogation of persons in American
custody is an enormous responsibility – and an inherently governmental function. This means it is a function that must only be
performed by government personnel, not contractors.19 Only in
this way can we hope to ensure the necessary accountability.
We must demand that judge advocates and civilian government attorneys remain proactively mindful of their professional
responsibilities to be a check-and-balance rather than simply
members of a priesthood with power to pronounce a benediction
over a course of action charted by others who may be more senior
but less scrupulous. What broad “lessons learned” in the area of
professional responsibility are being studied at the services’ law
schools in Charlottesville, Newport, and Montgomery?
We must be willing to punish our own, wherever they may be
in the official pecking order, or put on the public record cogent
reasons – if such there be – for not doing so. To the extent that
dereliction of duty may be at issue, or oppression of prisoners,
President Obama should consider increasing the potential maximum punishments under military law, as he has the power to do
under Article 56 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice.20 This

***
Congress is aware that it has to act. Last year, Representative
David Price (D-N.C.) introduced the Interrogation and Detention
Reform Act of 200814 that would make important improvements. Senator Dianne Feinstein (D-Calif.) introduced interrogation reform legislation when the 111th Congress convened
last month.15 Rather than go through all of the specifics of
these proposals, let me catalog some of the things we should be
looking for.
First, there must be a single, known, official standard.16
We cannot have one rule for CIA interrogations and another
for Defense Department interrogations. To permit competing
rulebooks is to invite both chaos and evasion. To his credit,
President Obama’s January 22, 2009 Executive Order on
“Ensuring Lawful Interrogations”17 applies across the board, so
that other agencies must use “processes that are substantially
equivalent to the processes the [Army Field] Manual prescribes
for the Department of Defense.” Wisely, that Executive Order
also forbids any federal official who interrogates individuals in
United States custody in armed conflicts to rely on any interpretation issued by the Justice Department between September
11, 2001 and January 20, 2009 with respect to federal criminal
27

will not have any impact on past conduct, of course,21 but it is a
way of sending a message as to the seriousness with which we
view these matters and thereby deterring future violations.
We must be alert to migration. On one level this means that
activities undertaken in some other setting – Survival, Evasion,
Resistance, and Escape (“SERE”) training, for example – are not
necessarily a reliable indicator of permissible conduct in actual
detention operations. On another level, before an interrogation
regime is permitted to migrate (as in the ill-advised decision to
send Maj. Gen. Geoffrey D. Miller to Iraq to “GITMO-ize” the
detention facility at Abu Ghraib), it must be vetted carefully
and at the highest levels to ensure that it comports with national
policy.

Finally, perhaps the most potent check on torture and abusive
interrogation is the power to resign. The grim history of the last
administration demonstrates that internal “push back” can be
effective. But at times more than that may be required. We do
not have a robust tradition of resignation-on-principle in this
country, but if we continue to find ourselves at or over the limits,
then I hope we will have officials with the moral courage to “put
their stars on the table” and resign – perhaps noisily, perhaps
quietly.22 I hope that those who resisted the worst in the Bush
Administration will serve as role models.
HRB
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